

Text used.

Association of Former Intelligence Officers
Sheraton Reston
1200 Friday 5 October 1979

Pleasantries

I thought what might interest you most, would be what I perceive to be different about being an intelligence officer today from just a few years ago.

In these past few years, three factors have strongly dictated change in the intelligence profession.

First, the United States role in international affairs is changing in ways that place new and often quite different demands on both the collection and the analysis of intelligence.

Second, the explosion of technology has changed the whole way we look at collection. It has forced us to rethink both how to handle the huge volumes of raw intelligence which we can now collect, and how to take the best advantage of both technical and human means of collection.

Third, the domestic environment in which we exist has changed. The fact that we live in a fishbowl today can neither be ignored nor wished back to former times.

Let me discuss each of these three important factors briefly.

In days cold war - adequate concentrate Sov Union - satellites - areas where probing for advantage

Today cannot relax guard on Sov activities -

But cannot ignore number of other nations / impact on our security and economic well being -

Almost too obvious mention OPEC -

But look only headlines -

Kampuchea

Nicaragua

Zimbabwe

Namibia

regularly see names

Must pay attention -

Look also at wider variety of topics beyond military and other more traditional security issues -

We must be concerned with economic trends / food resources, population growth, / narcotics flow, international terrorism, / and the illegal transfer of American technology / among others. / Intelligence faces a broader, more demanding set of requirements than ever before. / People with your background / can well appreciate the impact that such expansion must have: / on recruiting, / on training, / on priorities for funding new collection systems, etc.

Exciting - challenging - not business as before.

Desk

// The second area of greatest change / is ~~being driven by~~ the technological revolution in collection capability / Our capabilities in the photographic and signals intelligence areas / especially, / are growing more rapidly than anyone, I think, ever imagined. / Our real problem is becoming how to process, / evaluate and act on / what we are able to collect. / The importance of being able to screen information quickly and efficiently, / even old information, which at the time did not seem to be relevant, / has been underscored in just the past few weeks. I refer to the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

In 1963 we estimated -

the ground combat forces which the Soviets had introduced into Cuba had all been withdrawn. It was not until 1978 that we began to have strong suspicions that this was no longer the case. Thanks to an intelligence breakthrough in August of this year, we were able to adduce persuasive evidence that there is now a Soviet combined arms combat brigade in Cuba. Building on that evidence, and using new clues we obtained recently, we have reexamined data from 1962 until present. These probings still persuade us that the combat capability was withdrawn in 1963-64, but also show that by at least the mid-1970s such a capability had been reestablished in essentially its present form; that is, a combined arms brigade with three motorized infantry battalions, one tank battalion, and all of the normal artillery, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and other support elements common to a Soviet combatant unit of this size. This relook at 17 years worth of stored data could not have been done without the prodigious computer storage, retrieval and sorting capabilities which the Intelligence Community now possesses.

What has happened to HUMINT as technology has burgeoned? The value of the human intelligence agent has been enhanced. As photographic and signals intelligence answer questions, they also raise new ones, new ones which often only an individual on the ground can answer. Thus, today the challenge is not only to be able to absorb and use the vast quantities of data we obtain from technological systems, but to be able to meld them with human intelligence activities so that each can take best advantage of its strengths and compensate for the other's weaknesses. The ^{human agent} intelligence officer is too valuable an asset and his skills are too hard to develop for us to risk him unnecessarily.

By targetting him more carefully than ever, we are helping him to focus on the problems which have the biggest payoff. In spite of newspaper allegations to the contrary, there has not been nor will there be any diminution of the importance of HUMINT in the Intelligence Community of this nation as long as I am its Director.

To most, ^{people} the melding together of collection capabilities may sound very logical and very simple. I know you realize this is not the case. ^{the various types} Because technical capabilities are growing so fast; because human capabilities must be refocused; and because intelligence, as you know, is a large bureaucracy spread over many different government agencies and departments, each with its own priorities and concerns, we can no longer do business in the traditional manner. It has taken some fundamental restructuring to accommodate these changes. Since the National Security Act was passed in 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence has been authorized to coordinate all of the national intelligence activities of the country. However, until the President's new Executive Order of a year and a half ago, ^{DCI} he had inadequate authority to really do so. That Order strengthened my authority over the budgets and the collection activities of all of our intelligence organizations. This change is still evolving, but it is coming along well and is making a substantial difference in the management of intelligence.

// The third element of change I mentioned is the increasing public attention to intelligence activities since the investigations of 1975 and 1976. ^{As appropriate} Those investigations brought to American intelligence more public attention than has ever been focused on a major intelligence organization. That process destroyed much of the support and confidence

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which the public traditionally had for its intelligence services. /
Today I sense a gradual return of that support and confidence, / but I
also recognize a lingering suspicion of what intelligence organiza-
tions are doing. / The easy response to this would be to ignore it. / I
have been advised by some to do just that. / Unfortunately, that choice
is one that we don't have. / The door has been opened; / the public has
looked in, / ~~and especially with regard to our activities involving~~ *has become concerned*
~~they didn't like what they saw.~~ / The door cannot be
closed. / The public won't let us / nor will the Congress let us. / What
then is the answer? /

I believe the only realistic answer / is a controlled openness
program. / We are supported by public funds; / we do a great deal of work
for the government which, / incidentally, / is also useful to the general
public. I see no harm in sharing information with the public / which
can be declassified. / In fact, I see a number of real benefits. / It
permits us to draw the line / between what will be open / and what will
not / rather than someone else; / it permits the public to reap some
direct benefit / from taxes spent for intelligence; / it demonstrates in a
general but substantial way / the importance of the work we do on ~~the~~ *public's*
behalf; / and it rebuilds a degree of public support which, / had it
existed five years ago, / might have enabled us to weather better the
often unfounded attacks on our Community. /

But when I say controlled openness, / ~~and that we draw the line,~~
I mean just that. / Openness does not encompass legitimate, classified
intelligence, / nor information regarding sources or methods. / In fact,
at the same time that we are trying to be more open with the public /

than ever before, we are vigorously plugging the loopholes in the law which prevent us from prosecuting people who deliberately reveal classified information.

The improper dissemination of classified information is fast becoming our most serious problem. Leaks from within the government are a big part of this problem, but a part which we are working to control. Just as a career of security consciousness imbues you with the continuing feeling of responsibility to protect that classified or sensitive information which you learned in the course of your ^{careers} duties, each new employee must be made to feel that same serious, life-long responsibility. Better security measures are a part of the answer, but generating a true respect for classified information by those with access to it is the only solution. ~~The way of doing that is through a conscious program to purge the system of overly-classified information which tends to lessen our respect for the security system.~~

As I know you are well aware, another part of the problem results from the authorship of books and articles intended to disrupt legitimate intelligence activities. We should be able to do something about this but are severely constrained. Phillip Agee, for example, is still making a profession of exposing everything which he learned about the CIA or which he can find out. He and others regularly publish the slick bulletin, "Covert Action," here in Washington. Its professed objective is to identify undercover American intelligence officers around the world with results which I don't have to detail for this audience. I have virtually no legal recourse against this kind of activity. Consequently, I have proposed a new criminal statute which

✓ would make it an offense to disclose the identity of undercover CIA persons and agents whose relationship with the ^{an} Central Intelligence Agency must be deliberately concealed. The proposal is now being reviewed by the Administration. Senator Bentsen of Texas has already introduced his own version of this bill and several other versions have been introduced in the House. Legislation such as this and another bill narrowing what we are required to provide under the Freedom of Information Act would be most helpful to us and beneficial to the nation. ~~They are both examples of our increasing interaction with the law.~~ *I ask your support for them.*

We are even stymied when it comes to protecting classified information. There are some thirty U.S. laws which make it a crime to reveal tax information, commodity futures, and other commercial information. Almost no comparable legislation protects national security information. The law under which we generally must prosecute an individual for revealing classified information is the antiquated Espionage Act of 1917. Under it, proof of intent to harm the United States is required. You don't need to be a lawyer to appreciate the difficulty in proving intent of any kind. As long as an individual professes to believe that America would be better off as a result of his actions, it is difficult to prove that he intends to harm the country. We are also proposing legislation to correct this and I ask your support.

// Other dilemmas we face center on the many rules and regulations recently applied to intelligence activities, especially those to ensure the privacy of American citizens. The rights of Americans must be of concern to all of us. Yet, because these rules and regulations are new

and often complex/and because they must be interpreted in the light of our sometimes unique activities/ they have had a heavy impact on the speed and flexibility with which we have been traditionally capable of operating./ Very often questions of constitutional law/ have required both the Attorney General's staff/ and my legal staff to issue legal decisions in the midst of an operational crisis./

Let me give you one example./ Over a year ago a country was under siege./ The best information coming out of that country/ ^{was} came from the ham radio of an American missionary./ But, as you know,/ under an Executive Order we are prohibited from conducting electronic surveillance of American persons./ A ruling was finally made/ that as long as the missionary stuck to the CB and normal ham radio bands./ it was alright, we could listen./ But if he tried to disguise his broadcast/ as well he might in that situation, / that would indicate his desire for privacy/ and we would have to cease listening/ -and cease learning what was going on./

As you are well aware,/ complex issues such as these must be interpreted by people in the field/ who are not attorneys./ The initiative of the intelligence operator can be dulled/ by this need to ensure that all applicable legal standards are met/ Uncertainty can lead to overcaution and reduced capability/ Today, we are almost forced to avoid operations/ when there is a probability that an American may be involved./ This reduces our flexibility to respond in crisis situations./

It is my hope that much of this can be corrected/ by the passage of charters for the Intelligence Community./ I realize that not everyone agrees with the idea of charters/ -it is a debatable issue with solid arguments on both sides./ However, a great deal has changed/ in this

decade especially, and the clock cannot be turned back to the 1960s. There are those who would like to see the Community subjected to close, external control; others would emasculate the Community completely. The President and I believe that if the Community is to survive and continue to be able to perform the unique service to this nation that it has for over 32 years, then its authorities and its limitations must be clearly laid out, as much to protect the Intelligence Community from its enemies as to provide it with a firm basis for the future. Some kind of legislation is highly likely to emerge. Hence it is important that we participate actively in its formulation.

Let me end with a note of optimism, because that is just how I feel about the outlook today. I think that we have turned the corner after ~~nearly~~ ^{a number of} six difficult years. Just this past Monday night, in his speech to the nation, the President said, "We are enhancing our intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities--both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and our methods of collection, without impairing civil and constitutional rights." That ^{endorsement by} ~~support of~~ the President ^{and} toward our intelligence activities is much more likely today to be ^{accepted} ~~reflected~~ by the Congress and in the general public than even a year ago.

Appreciation of the importance of good intelligence is returning. Momentum is building for stronger intelligence capabilities. Yet those capabilities must reflect the changes in the environment around us, especially the three factors I dwelt on in the beginning. Thus, it is that we are undergoing in substantial internal change. The Community

will never look precisely as it once did but different is not less
capable. / You intelligence professionals, ~~both active and retired~~,
recognize this more than ~~most~~. / It is to you to whom the rest of the
public must turn for a better understanding of the many changes which
are taking place. / And in this regard, I ask you for your support.

ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
5 October 1979

Thank you David. Thank all of you for the opportunity of being here with you today, on the opening day of your convention. It is the opportunity to give you a view of how I see the state of intelligence in our country today.

I thought perhaps the way to start would be to describe to you how I perceive the role of an intelligence officer today as being different than it was perhaps just a few years ago. I believe there are three factors that dictate change in the intelligence profession today.

The first of these is the different role of the United States in world affairs. Our role is changing in ways that demand new and different forms of intelligence production and intelligence collection.

Secondly, there is change as a result of the explosion of technology which has adjusted the whole way we look at collecting intelligence information. It has forced us to rethink how we handled the huge volumes of raw intelligence data that we can now collect, and how to take advantage of both the technical and the human intelligence collection capability.

And thirdly, the domestic environment in which we live and work has changed. The fact that we are in a fishbowl today can neither be ignored nor wished to the past.

Let me talk about each of these briefly. First, the changing role of the United States in the world and its demands on us. If we look back to the days of the cold war, it was adequate for us to concentrate

very largely on the Soviet Union, its satellites and their efforts to probe into other areas of the world. Today, we cannot relax our guard on Soviet activities around the world. But, at the same time, we cannot ignore a lot of other nations whose activities impact on our security and on our economic well-being. Perhaps it is almost too obvious to mention OPEC as an example. But look also at the number of other countries--small, insignificant in size and influence--which affect our activities and whose names appear in our papers daily. Countries that we hardly ever heard of a few months or years ago--Kampuchea, Zibabwe, Namibia. Nicaragua--we have all known of it but who thought it would become as prominent in our lives as it has in recent months. Today we must pay attention to what is going on in countries like these.

Today we must also look at a much wider variety of topics. Looking beyond the military at other more traditional security issues. We must be concerned with economic trends, with food resources, with population growth, narcotics flow, international terrorism, the illegal transfer of American technology, and many other such esoteric fields. Intelligence today simply faces a broader, more demanding set of requirements than ever before. People with your background can well appreciate the impact that this can have. It goes back to our recruiting, the kind of people we want to bring in, the academic disciplines that they have. It goes to our training, what academic and other disciplines must we give to them in the course of their careers with us. It goes with the kind of funding that we put into new collection systems of one sort and another. It goes to the kind of funding we put into computers to process and store and sort data that our analysts have to use. This expansion of our requirements, our responsibilities, I believe makes the profession

more exciting today than ever before. I never know, when I come to work, what new topic, what whole new field I'm going to be involved in today or tomorrow. It is exciting, it's challenging, it is never business as before.

The second area of greatest change is the technological revolution in our collection capabilities. Our capabilities in photographic intelligence and signals intelligence are growing more rapidly than I believe anyone ever imagined that they would. Our real problem now is becoming how to process, evaluate, and act on this information which we are able to collect. The importance of being able to screen information quickly and efficiently, even old information which at the time it came in appeared not to be relevant, has been understood even better just the last few weeks. I am referring specifically to the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. In 1963 we estimated that the ground combat forces which the Soviets had introduced into Cuba during the missile period, had been withdrawn. It was not until 1978 that we began to have strong suspicions that this was no longer the case. Thanks to an intelligence breakthrough in August of this year, we were able to adduce persuasive evidence that there is now a Soviet combined arms combat brigade in Cuba. Building on this new evidence, these new clues that we received, we have reexamined data dating back to 1962. These probings persuade us that the combat capability was withdrawn in 1963-64, but they also show that at least by the mid-1970s such a capability had been reestablished in essentially its present form. That form is a combat brigade composed of three infantry battalions, one tank battalion, and all the normal artillery, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and support elements that are common to a Soviet combatant unit of this size. This relook at 17 years

worth of stored data could not have been done without the prodigious computer storage, retrieval and sorting capabilities that the Intelligence Community now possesses.

What has happened to HUMINT intelligence though as this technology has burgeoned? In fact, the value of the human intelligence agent has enhanced. As photographic and signals intelligence answer questions, they also raise more questions. Often, the questions that are raised are ones that can only be answered by a human on the scene. Thus, today our challenge is not only to be able to absorb and use these vast quantities of data which the technical systems bring to us, but to be able to meld them with the human intelligence activities so that each can take best advantages of its unique strengths and compensate for the other's weaknesses. The human agent is too valuable an asset and too difficult to develop for us to risk him unnecessarily. By targetting him more carefully than ever, we are helping him to focus on the problems which have the highest payoff for us. I would like to say that in spite of newspaper allegations to the contrary, there has not been and there will not be a diminution in the importance of HUMINT intelligence in the Intelligence Community of our country as long as I am its Director.

To most people, the melding together of these various types of intelligence collection capabilities sound very logical and very simple. I know that you realize, however, that because these technical capabilities are burgeoning; because the human capabilities must be refocused; and because intelligence in our country is spread over a large bureaucracy in many agencies, many departments, each with its own priorities and its own unique concerns, we can no longer continue to do business in the

traditional way. It has taken some fundamental restructuring to accommodate these changes. Since the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence has been authorized, charged to coordinate all of the national intelligence activities of our country. I believe that until President Carter's Executive Order of January 1978, the DCI had inadequate authority really to do this. That Order strengthened my authority over the budgets and over the collection activities of all of the national intelligence activities of our country. The change this has resulted in is still evolving, but I can assure you that it is coming along well and it is making a substantial difference in our intelligence and in the way in which we manage it.

The third element of change that I have mentioned is the increasing public attention to intelligence ever since the investigations of 1975 and 1976. As you well appreciate, those investigations brought to American intelligence more public attention than has ever before been focused on a major intelligence organization. That process, unfortunately, destroyed much of the support and confidence with which the public traditionally looked on our intelligence organizations. Today I sense a gradual return of that support and confidence, but I also recognize a lingering suspicion of what the intelligence organizations are doing. The easy response to this would be to ignore it and I have often been advised to do just that. Unfortunately, that choice is one that we really do not have. The door has been opened; the public has looked in, it has become concerned with the activities involving American in particular. The door cannot be closed. The public will not let us, the Congress will not let us. What then is the answer?

I believe the only realistic answer is a controlled openness.

We are supported by public funds; we do a great deal of work which, incidentally, can be of value to the American public. I see no harm in sharing such information with the public when it can be declassified. In fact, I see a number of real benefits. It permits us to draw the line between what will be open and what will not, rather than someone else; it permits us to demonstrate to the public that they can reap some benefits from the taxes they pay for us; it demonstrates in a general but substantial way the importance of the work we do in support of our country and its security; and, finally, it rebuilds a degree of public support which, had it existed five years ago, might have enabled us better to weather the often unfounded attacks upon our Community.

But when I say controlled openness, I mean just that. Openness does not encompass legitimate, classified intelligence, nor information regarding sources and methods. In fact today, at the same time that we are trying to be more open with the public than ever before, we are vigorously plugging the loopholes in the law which prevent us from prosecuting people who deliberately reveal classified information.

The improper dissemination of classified information is rapidly becoming our most serious concern. Leaks from within the government are a big part, and I can assure you we are doing everything we think we can to try to control that. Just as a career of security consciousness imbues you with a continuing sense of responsibility to protect that classified or sensitive information which you gained in the course of your careers, we must make each new employee today feel that same serious, life-long responsibility. Better security measures are a part

of the answer, but generating a true respect for classified information by those who have authorized access to it is the only real solution. Security awareness is the watchword in our organization today and we are really trying to drive home that understanding which is traditional to you and to me and others, but it is not as well accepted by new people coming in today.

As I know you are well aware though, another part of this problem results from the authorship of books and articles intended deliberately to disrupt legitimate intelligence activities. We should be able to do something about this, we are severely constrained. Phillip Agee, for example, continues to make a profession of exposing everything which he learned when he was in the CIA and everything he has been able to find out since. You know, he and some accomplices publish, here in Washington, a bulletin called "Covert Action." A bulletin with a professed objective of identifying undercover American intelligence officers. The results of this I clearly don't have to detail to you. I have virtually no legal recourse against this kind of activity. Consequently, I have proposed a new criminal statute that would make it an offense to disclose the identity of undercover intelligence persons and agents whose relationship with an intelligence agency must be deliberately concealed. This proposal is being reviewed within the Administration. A bill to this same purpose has been introduced into the Senate by Senator Bentsen and several bills have been introduced to the House of Representatives. Legislation such as this and another bill narrowing how we are required to provide information under the Freedom of Information Act would be very helpful to us and to our country. I know you are actively engaged in looking and supporting these kinds of measures, and I really appreciate

the attention which this organization gives to problems like this and the support you are providing us in helping to move this kind of essential legislation forward.

Other dilemmas that we face today are concerned with the rules and regulations that have sprung up in recent years over various kinds of intelligence activities, especially those involving the privacy of American citizens. The rights of Americans must be of concern to all of us. Yet, because these regulations are new and often very complex and because they must be interpreted in the light of our sometimes very unique activities, they have had a heavy impact on the speed and the flexibility with which we can respond. Very often questions of constitutional law are being debated by the Attorney General's people and my legal people while an operation is taking place in the field and guidance has to go out almost minute by minute.

Let me give you one example. It took place something over a year ago in a small country that was under siege. At that time, the best information coming out of that country was on a ham radio being operated by an American missionary. Now there we were. As you know, under an Executive Order we are constrained from conducting electronic surveillance of an American person. Finally after much debate, a ruling was made that if the missionary continued on the normal ham radio bands, we could continue to intercept his transmission. On the other hand, if he shifted around and showed some inclination to disguise his broadcast, as one might well in an insurgency situation, we were to be constrained from continuing to intercept his transmission. Constrained perhaps from being able to help him, if he were in trouble.

As you are well aware though, complex issues such as these must be interpreted by our people in the field who are not attorneys. The initiative of the intelligence operator can be dulled by this need to ensure that all applicable legal standards are met in an operational situation. Uncertainty can lead to overcaution and reduced capability. Today, we are almost forced to avoid operations where there is a high probability that an American may become involved. This does reduce our flexibility in crisis situations.

It is my hope that much of this can be corrected by passage of charter legislation. I know that not everyone is in favor of charters--it is a debatable issue and there are solid arguments on both sides. However, a great deal has changed, especially in the last decade, and the clock cannot be turned back to the 1960s. There are those who would like to see our Community subjected to close, external control; there are those who would like to see regulations that would emasculate it. The President and I believe that if the Community is to survive and if it is to be able to continue to perform the unique service to this nation that it has performed over the last 32 years, then its authority and its limitations must be clearly laid out--as much to protect the Intelligence Community from its enemies as to provide it with a firm basis for the future. Some kind of legislation is highly likely to emerge. Hence it is important that we participate actively in its formulation and, again, I am grateful that you are doing that.

Let me end on a note of optimism, because that is exactly how I see the outlook today. I think that we have turned the corner after a number of difficult years. Just this past Monday night, in his speech

to the nation, President Carter said the following about us. "We are enhancing our intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities--both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and our methods of collection, without impairing civil and constitutional rights." Now that endorsement by the President of our intelligence activities is much more likely to receive Congressional and general public support today than I believe it would have even as short as a year ago.

Appreciation of the importance of good intelligence is returning. Momentum is building for stronger intelligence capabilities. Yet these capabilities that we will build must reflect the changes in the environment around us, particularly the three factors that I've dwelt on in the beginning. Thus, it is that we are today undergoing substantial internal change. The Community will never look precisely as it once did--but different is not necessarily less capable. You intelligence professionals recognize this more than anyone. It is to you that the rest of the American public must turn for a better understanding of the many changes which are taking place. I appreciate and solicit your support in helping the American public to understand that the Intelligence Community of our country continues to be vital but, at the same time, it must adapt to the times and be ready to serve our country in the decades ahead as magnificently as it has in the past three plus decades. Thank you very much.

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS

Q: I see the CIA is advertising publicly for employees at this time ...

A: The CIA has been advertising in the papers for employees, is that a break with the past? Yes it is. It's a break from a number of years ago. Jack Blake, do you know when we started it--1972 was it?

Blake: To the best of my knowledge, we have been advertising in the press for 15 to 17 years.

A: 15 to 17 years? Very good. It has attracted more attention recently. I'm very enthusiastic about it because one of the changes in our recruiting that has taken place, particularly since the period of the intense criticisms, is that we are spreading out more across the country. We are trying to draw from all segments of our society--geographically, ethnically, educationally. We've been trying to bring in a true cross-section of Americans and we need that, particularly because of what I mentioned of the changing requirements for what we have to do with the different kinds of people, the different kinds of disciplines that we must encompass in order to do the different job we have today.

Q: Admiral, how do you suggest that those of us who are here who represent many segments of the country can assist you and the other active service intelligence agencies.....?

A: A question I appreciate. How can those of you who are here help us in doing our job better? First I ask you for understanding. For understanding in the sense to realize what we are doing and why we

are doing it, and that it isn't necessarily like it was done before and shouldn't be. And secondly, as I have mentioned in my remarks, I really do appreciate the fact that every piece of legislation that affects us, you and your organization is on top of and providing advice to the Congress and others as to what position to take. We try not to influence you, but we try to give you all the information that we have that will help you come to your independent judgment of what that position should be. Your attention to the public attitudes towards the Intelligence Community, expressed through speeches that many of you make to your contacts with various organizations, and through this organization and its activities on Congressional Hill and elsewhere is very, very valuable to us and much appreciated and I just ask you to keep it up.

Q: Sir, do youby the Congressional Intelligence Committee we can verify SALT?

A: Do I agree with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that we can verify SALT? I have followed in the tradition of my predecessors in not taking a position on whether we can verify an agreement like this or not because the judgment, and it must be a judgment, on whether you can verify a treaty is not something that is the province of an intelligence officer. It must integrate in considerations of how valuable would the treaty be to the country, what would we do if we found they were cheating. Those are not our province. What I have done is attempt scrupulously to follow a straight line down the middle of describing to the Congress of the United States specifically how well we can check on each provision of the treaty. It is then

up to the Senators, and of course up to the President, to judge whether on balance that is adequate verification for our country to enter into this arrangement and promote its own security. I believe that with tremendous support from all the Intelligence Community, and when I testified repeatedly on this before the committees of the Senate I insisted on having with me the heads of all of the major intelligence activities of the Community so that we went up and where we differed, we explained why we differed; where we agreed, they knew we agreed. The Senate was able to get as full, as frank, as complete a picture of what we could do and what we couldn't do as it was humanly possible to give them. I am gratified personally that they have come out with such a fine report.

Q: You've covered the laws that we're trying to help on. The second, and probably the most important thing to this organization
Can you answer us how we can help bring them into technical and?

A: How can we help with bringing youth into technical and HUMINT? Let me say that I am very impressed with American youth's ability to discern what is really important and what is a lot of flim-flam. During the height of the criticism of intelligence agencies, and particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, the recruiting of young men and women stayed up and it is up today. We are not advertising out of any sense of desperation. The numbers are up, the numbers are there, the quality is good. The young people of this country are not fooled by a vociferous minority who want to criticize some of the most important agencies of the government.

The way you can help is to continue to encourage young people to go into our training programs, to come to our summer programs like Dave's daughter didn't quite do. (Tape turned) people in saying if a young person is interested in our profession, let him or her study what really interests the young person. We want people who are better, far better than average in whatever their particular sphere of speciality is. We don't care when we are recruiting whether it is a biologist, or a chemist, or a liberal arts student, or a language student because we have pegs and holes that fit them in regardless of those academic qualifications. We need almost every discipline that exists so we want the young people to do what makes them prove that they are better than the other person; more innovative, more forward moving. And when we see that in them because they are in a field that they really are interested in, we can place them. One of the things I was hinting at earlier in my comments was that on the human intelligence side today, the tradition of going toward the liberal arts graduates no longer can prevail. We need a lot of those. We need a lot of jacks-of-all-trades and people who understand the bigger picture of world politics. Some of those human intelligence people have got to be able to work eyeball-to-eyeball with the scientists who understand the _____ repetition frequency of the Soviet radar and can ask the right question and get the right answer right now, not _____ have an opportunity to do. So we are looking for more scientifically trained people. We are looking for more people with economic backgrounds in the human intelligence sphere than ever before.

Q: As the Director of Central Intelligence, spread across the board, we've got lots of ROTC and we've got (inaudible) How's your program going in the services? How's it going (inaudible)?

A: How is the recruiting going across the board in the government, particularly in the military and the FBI and the other non-CIA intelligence agencies? The military is a special problem with the all-volunteer force. I'm not closely abreast of that but my understanding is they are having problems on the retention end there. The FBI, NSA, they are having the same fine recruiting climate that we are. I think we are doing better than the military in the retention of these fine young people. I would like to say that if there is one thing I have tried to stress in my short time as Director, it is the criticality of making our profession attractive to these young people, in managing our people well so they understand their part of a team that cares for them, that has a plan for them that is going to try to ensure that they are given an opportunity to use every talent that they have in the service of their country. We need a great deal of attention to that. We are really a very young service--32 years is just a beginning. I believe in the next few years we have to cement the management techniques that will let us run for a century. I feel that the responsibility of those of us in the top leadership of the Intelligence Community today is almost as much to ensure that we are going to be ready for 1989 as it is to provide our service in 1979.

Q: Admiral, with respect to verification of SALT, what is the impact of the loss of the manual KH-11 satellite?

A: What is the impact on SALT verification of the loss of the KH-11 satellite manual? Very little. When we make our estimates on how well we can check on SALT, we automatically have always assumed that most of our intelligence collection capabilities would be reasonably well known by the other side. That is always a danger and we have to work on that kind of a workcase assumption. In addition, there is a relatively little--though there are things but not major things--can be done to conceal the vast amount of activity involved in the large numbers of missiles and things handled in the SALT treaty. That is an oversimplification. We all know this camouflage and this kind of thing, but we are not talking about two new battalions or something we're trying to conceal. We're talking about 2,250 major huge intercontinental weapons systems that are covered by this treaty so there is still _____ in these systems.

